Household debt: implications for monetary policy and financial stability by Tientip Subhanij & Bank for International Settlements
136  BIS Papers No 46
 
 
Household sector and monetary policy 




Monitoring house price inflation and the build-up of household debt is important for the 
conduct of Thailand’s monetary policy. Although the Bank of Thailand (BOT) does not 
directly take into account the level of household debt or house price movements when it 
decides to change short-term interest rates, it recognises that changes in the policy rate 
could strongly affect house prices, household borrowing and overall consumption.  
A reduction in the policy rate could lead to an unsustainable increase in debt, thereby raising 
the risk of undershooting the target inflation rate in the future. At times of easy monetary 
policy, a rise in both household disposable income and housing prices could encourage 
households to consume more and build up debt. A boom in house prices could be of great 
concern to policymakers because it might enable households to increase their consumption 
by betting on higher expected future incomes, which could affect economic stability.  
Higher debt levels could make things substantially worse if there is a shock to the economy 
and people are unable to get their loans renewed. If they become unemployed and cannot 
obtain loans, they will significantly reduce consumption because they will be, or will have the 
prospect of being, unable to service their debts. In the face of excessive debt, tighter 
monetary policy could induce greater precautionary saving and a larger drop in consumption.  
It is hard to predict whether higher debt levels would lead to a significant additional cutback 
in consumption that would not respond to an easing of monetary policy. The impact would 
depend primarily on the structure of the household sector, the ability of households to service 
debt, the availability of credit and financing conditions.  
This paper attempts to examine the above issues by looking at the structure of household 
balance sheets, the build-up of household debt and the roles of housing prices and housing 
finance in Thailand. The BOT’s monetary policy stance since the adoption of an inflation 
targeting framework is also discussed in order to provide some perspective on the linkages 
between monetary policy and the household sector. In the following sections of this paper, 
we discuss Thailand’s monetary policy framework, the relevant literature, current conditions 
in Thailand’s household sector, current consumption and household debt, housing prices and 
mortgage financing and the role of monetary policy and housing price movements in 
explaining output fluctuations. We present our conclusions in the final section.  
Thailand’s current monetary policy strategy 
It may be useful to begin by putting the BOT’s current monetary policy strategy into 
perspective. The development of Thailand’s monetary policy framework can be divided into 
three periods. First, from the end of World War II to June 1997, Thailand had a pegged 
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exchange rate regime. During this time the baht was pegged to gold, the US dollar or a 
basket of currencies. The peg to a basket of currencies was in place from November 1984 to 
June 1997. Under the pegged exchange rate regime, the Exchange Equalization Fund (EEF) 
would announce and defend the baht’s value against the US dollar daily.  
However, with the speculative attack on the baht at the onset of the Asian financial crisis, the 
peg was abandoned and the baht allowed to float on 2 July 1997. The BOT adopted a 
monetary targeting regime deemed to be consistent with the move to a managed float. The 
monetary targeting regime was in place until May 2000. During this time Thailand received 
financial assistance from the IMF, and the BOT targeted the domestic money supply by 
setting the daily and quarterly monetary base targets.  
The third period began on May 23, 2000 when the BOT announced the adoption of an 
inflation targeting regime, which is still in place today as Thailand’s monetary policy 
framework. The BOT switched to inflation targeting because the relationship between the 
money supply and output growth had become less stable.  
There are four dimensions to Thailand’s current monetary policy formulation under the 
inflation targeting regime:  
1.  The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) sets out monetary policy in order to attain 
price stability conducive to sustainable economic growth. With its most recent 
Inflation Report, the MPC also began to monitor factors contributing to external 
stability and financial imbalances. 
2.  The monetary policy instrument used by the MPC as the key policy rate to signal the 
monetary policy stance is the one-day repurchase rate (RP).    
3.  The MPC’s policy target is core inflation (excluding raw food and energy) of between 
0 and 3.5% (quarterly average). In the event the target is missed, the MPC is 
required to explain the reasons to the public. 
4.  The BOT has developed a macroeconomic model to forecast economic conditions 
and the inflation outlook. 
Under the inflation targeting regime, one of the most critical responsibilities of the BOT is the 
achievement of price stability. Indeed, since the adoption of inflation targeting in 2000, the 
BOT has never once missed its core inflation target (see Graph 1). Before the current regime 
was adopted, core and headline inflation appeared to track each other, with their means 
relatively close. Core inflation was chosen as the target due to its lower volatility (Table 1). 
However, given that increases in oil and food prices are no longer a temporary phenomenon, 
core and headline inflation appear to be diverging more than before, and so the target for 
inflation is now under review.  
Despite its stated objective of targeting inflation, the BOT also monitors financial imbalances 
that may bring instability to the Thai economy. In each of its meetings, the MPC considers 
seven areas where financial imbalances could occur: the household sector, the real estate 
sector, external stability, financial institutions, the financial status of the corporate sector, 




Development of core and headline inflation  
Before inflating targeting  After inflation targeting 
Q1 1986–Q1 2000  Q2 2000–Q4 2007  In per cent  
Headline Core Headline Core 
Mean    4.66 4.59 2.52 1.01 
Standard  deviation  2.17 1.68 1.56 0.77 
Source: Author’s estimates.  
 
Graph 1 
Core versus headline inflation  
In per cent 
 
Source: Bank of Thailand.  
The BOT recognises that booms and busts in asset prices, especially housing prices, should 
be seen as part of a broader set of symptoms that normally also include a build-up of debt. 
During an upswing, household balance sheets may look healthy as the appreciation in asset 
values offsets the build-up of debt. But if the prevailing mood is one of pessimism, rather than 
optimism, leading to a correction in asset valuations and a sharp deterioration in net worth, 
financial distress may result. The MPC therefore takes account of various indicators of financial 







































































































































The life cycle hypothesis of saving and consumption, first developed by Modigliani and 
Brumberg (1954) and later augmented by Ando and Modigliani (1963), stated that all sources 
of an increase in wealth, whether from stocks, real estate or any other assets, should have 
the same positive effect on household consumption.  
However, it has been argued that the consumption effect of changes in housing wealth 
should be larger than that of changes in other assets, such as stocks, because housing 
wealth is held by a larger proportion of households. Since only rich people have excess 
savings to invest in the stock market and since the marginal propensity to consume out of 
wealth is lower for the rich, as economic theory and empirical evidence suggest (Lusardi 
(1996), Souleles (1999)), then changes in housing wealth might have a larger effect on 
consumption than changes in stock market wealth. Moreover, because house prices are 
much less volatile than stock prices, changes in housing wealth might be viewed as much 
longer-lasting than changes in stock market wealth, another reason that housing wealth 
should have a greater effect on consumption.  
Given that some households might be credit-constrained, the existence of additional credit 
channels that work through effects on housing prices may be quite significant. Credit-
constrained households are affected by current cash flows – that is, by the difference 
between income and expenses. When short-term rates or a variable rate on a mortgage 
increase, households will have higher interest payments and reduced cash flow.  
One of the reasons households become credit-constrained is the problem of asymmetric 
information in the credit market, ie adverse selection and moral hazard problems. For this 
reason, collateral is used to reduce these information problems. Good collateral can 
decrease lenders’ losses if borrowers default and reduces the incentives for borrowers to 
take on excessive risk because they have something to lose. 
Given the importance of collateral in reducing the problem of asymmetric information in the 
credit market, where residential mortgages are readily available to homeowners, then a rise 
in house prices enhances the value of the collateral for the homeowner. This in turn improves 
both the amount and the terms of credit available to homeowners. This situation can also be 
expressed in terms of the financial accelerator framework of Bernanke and Gertler (1995) 
and Bernanke et al (1999). According to this theory, higher house prices reduce the gap 
between the default-free interest rate and the effective interest rate facing the homeowner, 
the so-called external finance premium. A rise in house prices, which improves a household’s 
balance sheet, then leads to a decline in the external finance premium or effective cost of 
borrowing. 
Higher house prices can also have the effect of relaxing credit constraints. When house 
prices rise, homeowners have additional collateral against which they can borrow. This 
provides a channel through which rising house prices can stimulate consumption spending. 
Many economists see this channel as playing a very important direct role in determining 
spending (Greenspan and Kennedy, (2005), Hatzius (2005), Benito et al, (2006)). 
Monetary policy can affect household spending by easing/tightening credit conditions and 
increasing/reducing housing prices. Expansionary monetary policy in the form of lower 
interest rates could stimulate the demand for housing, which leads to higher house prices. 
The resulting increase in total wealth will stimulate household consumption. Standard life 
cycle wealth effects operating through house prices are thus an important element in the 
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In terms of the appropriate monetary policy response to asset prices, economists hold rather 
different views. Some economists, such as Cecchetti and others (2000), Borio and Lowe 
(2002) and White (2004), argue that central banks should occasionally raise interest rates to 
stop asset price inflation from getting out of control. Other economists, however, contend that 
monetary policy aimed only at stabilising inflation is more likely to produce good outcomes 
for the economy (Bernanke and Gertler (2001)). 
Household sector 
Household balance sheet 
An examination of the household balance sheet yields some information about the state of 
household finances in Thailand. According to a recent survey by Thailand’s National 
Statistical Office (NSO) and the BOT, household assets in Thailand equal approximately 
228% of GDP and significantly exceed household debt, which equals around 27% of GDP.
2 
This implies that if household liabilities are redeemed, households will remain solvent as they 
hold sufficient assets to cover their liabilities. It should be noted, however, that the majority of 
household assets in Thailand are not liquid and may be subject to price declines during 
distress selling.  
Assets such as real estate, for example, are difficult to liquidate. As a result, households with 
positive wealth may face cash flow problems, even though they may be solvent. Despite the 
fact that the value of total household assets is far greater than that of household debt, the 
household sector is still potentially vulnerable to shocks because the ratio of liquid assets 
(ie financial assets) to GDP – 30% – is only slightly higher than the ratio of household debt to 
GDP, while real estate assets amount to approximately 164% of GDP. This suggests that the 
financial position of the household sector might be rather less resilient than it appears to be 
in the aggregate balance sheet data.  
Graph 2 shows the extent to which household assets are dominated by real estate holdings. 
Financial assets account for only 13% of total assets. Bank deposits account for 55% of total 
financial assets, while securities – stocks, bonds and mutual funds – account for a much less 
significant portion, around 2%. The current structure of financial assets indicates that Thai 
households still rely more on banks than on capital markets. This is consistent with the fact 
that Thailand has a largely bank-based financial system, in terms of both deposits and 
lending.  
And in terms of types of asset holdings, equities are much less significant in wealth creation 
than real estate. Residential and commercial real estate accounts for more than two thirds of 
total assets in Thailand. Since 99.5% of Thai enterprises are small and medium-sized, it is 
not surprising that households hold the largest share of commercial real estate (29%). This 
pattern is consistent with international experience, in that real estate accounts for a large 
portion of household assets in most countries. 
                                                  
2  This survey, the outcome of a joint project between the BOT and the NSO, is a first attempt to measure 
household debt and assets across Thailand. The survey involves 11,162 households from all regions;  6,980 
of the households live in urban areas and 4,182 in rural areas. Sample weights are calculated by the NSO to 
obtain statistics at the national level. Ariyapruchya et al (2007) based their analysis of the current state of the 














































The importance of real estate in Thai households’ asset portfolios derives from the fact that 
the first risky asset in which young households invest is usually real estate. As households 
age and become richer, they invest in other risky assets, such as stocks. In terms of the 
composition of household debt, Graph 3 shows that real estate also accounted for a large 
part of household debt (30%) in 2006, the same as consumption (30%), followed by business 
and agricultural debts (14% and 13%, respectively).  
The large share of real estate in the asset and debt portfolios of Thai households indicates 
that households are likely to be quite vulnerable to volatility in real estate prices. In addition, 
the ratio of debt to assets is higher for low-income than for high-income households, 
suggesting that the former are more vulnerable to shocks. Higher debt is not necessarily a 
bad thing because it provides households with ways to smooth consumption. The risk is that 
high debt levels could force lower-income households to reduce consumption and defer 
payments on loans in the event of a shock.  142  BIS Papers No 46
 
 
Household financial access 
Households that have adequate liquid assets or access to credit markets would not need to 
make large cuts in consumption were household members to become unemployed. Instead, 
they would simply run down their savings or borrow more. On the other hand, households 
that have no liquid assets and cannot borrow would be forced to cut back spending in line 
with their reduced incomes.  
Using data from the NSO’s Household socio-economic survey and the newly designed 
questionnaire for measuring financial access and literacy that is attached to it, Ariyapruchya et al 
(2007) find that 90.4% of households have access to financial services; 83.65% are served by 
the formal sector, while the rest are served by the semi-formal and informal sectors. Thus, 
households with no financial access account for only 9.61% of the population.
3  
Graph 4 
Household financial access structure 
As a percentage of households 
 
Source: NSO-BOT, Household socio-economic survey, Q4 2006. 
In this study, households are divided into five income groups of equal size, with the highest 
incomes falling in the fifth quintile and the lowest in the first. The majority of households 
using the services of commercial banks and bank-like institutions in the formal sector are 
from the third, fourth and fifth quintiles – 13.13%, 16.39% and 18.81%, respectively.
4 In 
contrast, the majority of those served by specialised financial institutions (SFIs) are from the 
first and second quintiles – 6.41% and 5.73%, respectively – while the share of households 
                                                  
3    The formal sector consists of formal financial institutions with clear legal status that are supervised or 
examined by the BOT – commercial banks, specialised financial institutions (SFIs), finance companies, credit 
fonciers, credit card and personal loan companies. The semi-formal sector consists of financial institutions that 
have legal status but are not supervised or examined by the BOT – cooperatives, credit unions and village 
funds. The informal sector consists of financial institutions that have no legal status and are not overseen by 
the Thai authorities – savings groups, moneylenders and other unspecified financial providers, such as 
pawnshops.  
4   The average monthly income in each group, starting with the bottom quintile, is THB 3,860.32, THB 7,765.35, 
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in the middle, high and highest income groups using the services of SFIs is 4.12%, 2.68% 
and 0.98%, respectively.  
Thus, lower-income households obtaining financial services from the formal sector but 
unable to gain access to commercial banks and bank-like institutions rely mainly on SFIs.  
Despite the relatively high proportion of households that have access to financial services, 
the story of household credit access is different. Approximately 33.93% of households do not 
use loans or other credit products from any financial institution (Graph 5). About 43.35% of 
households obtain loans and credit products from the formal sector, 31.02% of them from 
commercial banks and SFIs and the other 12.33% from finance companies, credit fonciers 
and credit card and personal loan companies. 
Graph 5 
Household credit access structure 
As a percentage of households 
 
Source: NSO-BOT, Household socio-economic survey, Q4 2006. 
It is interesting to note that although only 9.61% of households do not have access to 
financial services, a much larger percentage of households do not have any access to credit. 
Most of the households that do not have credit access are in the two lowest income groups 
(the first and second quintiles), and inadequate collateral has been identified as the major 
obstacle to access. 
In summary, this section gives a bird’s-eye view of the characteristics of Thailand’s 
household sector. It remains relatively healthy in terms of the ratio of aggregate debt to 
assets, which is over 8:1. However, it should be noted that this broadly healthy household 
balance sheet masks the vulnerability of households to changes in housing prices. Real 
estate accounts for a large proportion of both the asset and the debt portfolios of the 
household sector, making it quite sensitive to shocks such as unemployment or rising 
interest rates. Households may face an increased debt burden and be unable to liquidate 
their assets in time to cover increased debt servicing costs. Combined with the fact that 
33.93% of Thai households do not have access to credit, shocks could be exacerbated as a 
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Consumption and household debt 
A key feature of the Thai economy since the adoption of inflation targeting has been 
relatively stable household spending, in both real and nominal terms. The ratio of 
consumption to GDP has held steady at roughly 50% since 2000. GDP growth was driven 
primarily by consumption growth before 2006, when the contribution of consumption growth 
to GDP growth dropped (Graph 6). 
Graph 6 
Contribution to GDP growth 
 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board. 
The slowing or acceleration of consumption growth, however, appears to be consistent with 
the monetary policy cycle. When inflation targeting was first adopted in 2000, economic 
growth remained weak because of the legacy of the 1997 crisis, so monetary policy easing 
was used to support economic recovery. During the expansionary phase (May 2000–July 
2004), private consumption growth averaged around 5.2% a year. During the period of 
monetary tightening (August 2004–December 2006), consumption growth also began to 
slow. Private consumption growth during this period decreased to around 4.2% annually. The 
BOT adopted an accommodative monetary policy at the beginning of 2007, lowering the 
policy rate by 1.75% in the first half of 2007 and then maintaining it at 3.25% for the rest of 
the year. As a result, consumption growth, along with GDP growth, started to pick up in the 
second half of 2007 (Graph 7), indicating that household consumption is quite sensitive to 
changes in short-term interest rates.  
The decline in private consumption growth in 2006 has been associated with a decline in 
household debt, which has been rising more slowly than income since 2006 (Graph 8), 
leading to a slight drop in the ratio of debt to disposable income, which stood at 52.1% at 
end-2007 (Graph 9).  
It is interesting to note that the household debt cycle appears to be correlated with the 
housing price cycle. An increase in household debt is associated with an acceleration in 
housing price inflation and vice versa. Given the current benign housing market environment, 
Thailand’s debt-to-income ratio remains at a low level by international standards. For the 
past few years, the slowdown in the housing market has been accompanied by reductions in 




















Changes in inventory and statistical discrepancies









Monetary policy stance and consumption growth 
 
Source: Bank of Thailand.  
Graph 8 
Housing prices and household debt 
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Sources: NSO; authors’ calculations. 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of variables discussed in this section. House prices are 
strongly and positively associated with both household credit (0.8) and private consumption 
(0.7) in Thailand. In particular, house prices appear to influence the credit and consumption 
cycle of households. Meanwhile, the rise in household credit is associated with a rise in 
spending. Changes in short-term interest rates in the previous two quarters are negatively 
correlated with house prices, real consumption and real GDP. The channels through which 
monetary policy might affect spending will be further examined below, in the section “Putting 
it all together: monetary policy linkages”.  
 
Table 2 
Correlation matrix: Q1 1993–Q4 2007 














Household  credit  1.00        
Policy  rate  0.3242  1.0000      
Housing  prices  0.8068  –0.0532  1.0000     















Real  GDP  0.5610 –0.4620  0.8012 –0.6144  0.9491  1.0000 
1  RP 14-day with two quarter lags. 
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Another indicator of the decline in household debt can be seen in the latest Household socio-
economic survey (NSO (2007)).
5 The ratio of indebted households dropped from 66.4% in 
2004 to 63.3% in 2007, reflecting the improved debt servicing capacity of Thai households in 
recent years. It should be noted, however, that the average debt per household increased 
from THB 104,571 in 2004 to THB 116,681 in 2007. And although the survey found that 
household income exceeded household expenses in most cases, the difference between the 
two was only THB 4,160 per household or THB 1,300 per person, most of which is being 
used to pay off debts. This implies that if there is a shock to household cash flows – 
ie unemployment or rising interest rates – households may need to cut back consumption. 
Upon further examination of the structure of household indebtedness, we see that housing-
related loans dominate household borrowing (Table 3). At the end of 2007, loans from 
commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions to households totalled around 
THB 1,558 billion, of which housing, credit card and personal loans accounted for 49.5%, 
11.5% and 39%, respectively. Although the growth of credit card and personal loans has 
slowed since 2006, that of housing loans has accelerated. In general, households’ ability to 
repay debt has improved, as seen in the continuing decline of the ratio of non-performing 
household loans.  
 
Table 3 
Outstanding household loans, 2007 
 
Loans 
In billions of baht 
As share of  
total loans 
In per cent 
Ratio of  
non-performing 
loans to total 
household loans  
In per cent 
Household loans  1,558  100.0  4.0 
Housing loans  771  49.5  4.5 
Credit card loans  179  11.5  3.3 
Bank 139  8.9  3.5 
Non-bank 41  2.6  2.6 
Personal loans   607  39.0  3.5 
Bank 520  33.4  3.4 
Non-bank 88  5.6  3.9 
Source: Bank of Thailand.  
 
Indicators of financial imbalances show that although the ratio of non-performing household 
loans from commercial banks is still low compared to the past couple of years, the ratio of 
special-mention loans
6 suggests more vulnerability in the low to medium income groups 
(Graphs 11 and 12). In other words, low- to middle-income households appear to be less 
financially robust than high-income households.  
                                                  
5  This survey of 52,000 households was conducted in all of Thailand’s provinces during January–December 
2007.  




Ratio of NPLs to total loans outstanding of commercial banks
1 
In per cent 
 
1   Thai commercial banks and branches of foreign banks.     
2   Household loans comprise housing, 
credit card and personal loans. 
Source: Bank of Thailand. 
Graph 11 
Past-due and non-performing credit card loans  
broken down by income group
1 













1  Bank and non-bank credit card loans under the BOT’s supervision. Incomes 
shown here are monthly. 
Source: Bank of Thailand.  
Special-mention credit card loans to households with monthly incomes below or equal to 
THB 15,000 account for about 4% of total loans, while those to households with incomes 
above THB 50,000 account for around 3.19%. The distribution of special-mention personal 
loans among the income groups is even more uneven. The special-mention personal loan 
ratio for households with monthly incomes below or equal to THB 15,000 is around 7%, 
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non-performing loan ratios may mask the rise in household debt problems in some income 
groups.  
Graph 12 
Ratio of special-mention loans to personal  
loans broken down by income group
1 












1  Bank and non-bank personal loans under the BOT’s supervision. Incomes shown here are 
monthly. 
Source: Bank of Thailand. 
 
Table 4 
Sensitivity of special-mention loans to interest rate shocks
1 
Income group
2  Credit-card loans  Personal loans  
Less than THB 5,000   n.a 0.66 
THB 5,000–10,000   n.a 0.47 
THB 10,000–15,000   n.a 0.02 
THB 15,000–20,000   0.63 0.17 
THB 20,000–25,000   0.65  –0.07 
THB 25,000–30,000   0.76  0.27 
THB 30,000–50,000   0.77  0.18 
More than THB 50,000   0.80  0.70 
Overall 0.74  0.02 
1  RP 14-day with two quarter lags.    
2  Incomes shown here are monthly.
 
We further examine the interest rate sensitivity of special-mention loan ratios in various 
income groups. Table 4 shows that the ratio of special-mention credit card loans appears to 
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in the higher income group is less sensitive to interest rate changes but is still quite 
vulnerable to interest rate shocks in the low income groups, especially for households with 
monthly incomes below or equal to THB 10,000 (0.47–0.66). This is not surprising given that 
the average monthly necessary expenses of Thai households come to THB 14,500 (NSO 
(2007)). Households with monthly incomes below THB 15,000 will likely be sensitive to 
interest rate shocks as a result of higher debt burdens.  
Currently, the BOT regards the financial delinquency of low- to middle-income households as 
a temporary problem, as households’ income and ability to service debt should improve in 
the future with economic recovery supported by the authorities’ accommodative monetary 
policy stance. However, it is necessary to continue monitoring developments in delinquency 
ratios for this particular income group to ensure that, going forward, overall financial stability 
will not be affected. 
Housing market 
Housing price development 
Given that 30% of household debt and 72% of household assets are in the real estate sector, 
the issue of housing prices and housing finance is of critical importance for Thailand. 
Housing price growth in Thailand has exhibited a downward trend since the beginning of 
2006, with some rebound in the third quarter of 2007 following rising construction costs. 
Overall, however, the housing market environment has been benign, with the prices of town 
houses, single-family detached houses and condominiums declining over the past few years. 
The prices of luxury condominiums, in particular, dropped considerably, partly owing to price 





1  Quarterly change in house price index. 
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Examining the housing price bubble in nine countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Glindro et al 
(2008) find that the price risk in Bangkok’s average housing market segment remains low, 
although there is some evidence of overvaluation in the luxury condominium market. This is 
consistent with the BOT’s view that, in general, the probability of a real estate price bubble 
and the risks surrounding the housing sector are still low. 
Housing finance  
Housing finance is an important factor in determining housing prices in Thailand. Most 
developers require adequate funding for construction and consumers rely on borrowed funds 
from financial institutions for purchasing homes.  
In Thailand, residential mortgage debt represented approximately 18.32% of GDP at the end 
of December 2007. The mortgage market has grown to exceed the level recorded prior to the 
1997 crisis. In contrast, the ratio of real estate project loans to GDP has been much lower in 
the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period because capital markets have become an 
important alternative source of funding for developers (Graph 14).  
Graph 14 
Ratio of mortgage loans to GDP 
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Source: Bank of Thailand. 
Meanwhile, financial institutions are still the major providers of residential mortgage loans 
because homebuyers have limited access to other sources. Mortgage loans are available to 
homebuyers from both public and private financial institutions. The former include the 
Government Housing Bank (GHB) and Government Saving Bank (GSB) and the latter 
include commercial banks, finance companies and credit foncier companies. 
Graph 15 breaks down outstanding mortgage loans by source. It shows that the role of the 
public financial institutions – particularly the GHB – as a source of financing for households 
has grown since the crisis. This is a result of government policy measures to help low- and 
medium-income workers buy their own homes. At end-2007, the GHB had a market share of 
38.77% and the GSB, 8.27%. Thus, the combined market shares of the GHB and the GSB 

























































































50 Year-on-year change, in per cent
Commercial banks  Finance companies
Credit foncier companies Government Housing Bank
Government Savings Bank Growth of  housing loans
 
Source: Bank of Thailand. 
Commercial banks, however, still dominate housing finance, with a market share of 52.9% as 
of end-2007. This is because of the strong competition between commercial banks, which 
use promotional tactics such as offering low one- to three-year fixed interest rates and longer 
maturities on mortgages.  
The market for primary mortgage finance in Thailand is fairly segmented. Commercial banks 
usually compete for middle- and high-income households (many mortgage loans range from 
THB 1 million to THB 5 million), whereas the GHB has been serving households with more 
modest incomes. The increasing market share of the GHB is due largely to its low lending 
rates and the rapid expansion of its branch network.  
The development of a secondary mortgage market in Thailand – particularly the repackaging 
of pools of mortgages into mortgage-backed securities – was proposed nearly two decades 
ago as a means of mobilising funds for the GHB. However, circumstances at that time did not 
permit mortgage securitisation. It was only in the early 1990s, under Thailand’s Seventh 
National Economic and Social Development Plan (1992–96), that securitisation was 
approved as an instrument for boosting long-term savings and developing capital markets. 
Under the plan, the GHB was given a role to play in the securitisation of mortgage assets, 
and it will soon issue its first mortgage-backed securities (Glindro et al (2008)).  
Mortgage rate 
Thailand’s housing finance market has generally been successful in delivering funding to 
individual homebuyers and developers at a reasonable cost, particularly in the context of the 
recovery from the 1997 crisis. The predominant product is a 25- to 30-year floating rate loan 
with rates adjusted to each bank’s posted minimum lending rate (MLR) or minimum retail rate 
(MRR) (plus or minus a margin). Most lenders offer a one- to two-year “teaser” attractive 
fixed rate.  
Some of the characteristics of housing loans today are a legacy from the past. This is due 
partly to government policy measures and partly to the intense competition among financial 
institutions, which motivates them to offer attractive terms on residential mortgages. The 
1997 crisis was followed by a long period of expansionary monetary policy. Interest rates 
dropped to, and stayed at, low levels for a number of years. During this time, financial BIS Papers No 46  153
 
 
institutions introduced various mortgage packages to attract customers. The competition 
among financial institutions has led them to raise loan-to-value (LTV) ratios from 80% to 
85%, on average, of the appraised value of single-family detached houses, and from 75% to 
80%, on average, of the appraised value of condominiums. In order to prevent instability in 
the real estate sector, in December 2003 the BOT set the LTV ratio for residences with an 
appraised value over THB 10 million at 70%. 
In order to increase the affordability of housing, the government launched real estate 
stimulus packages in 1998 to enable commercial banks to offer both new and old borrowers 
maturities of 30 years on mortgages. The maximum repayment period for mortgage loans 
has, therefore, been extended from 20 years before the crisis to 30 years. The Thai 
government has also provided support to homebuyers, increasing the amount of mortgage 
interest they can deduct from their personal income taxes to THB 100,000, from THB 50,000.  
In terms of performance, the quality of mortgage loan portfolios has improved, with the share of 
non-performing loans declining from almost 18% in early 2004 to 4.5% at the end of 2007. 
Banks have improved debt collection procedures (although the foreclosure process is still 
plagued by delays) and, in the case of old non-performing loans, have increased provisioning 
and write-offs, or sold the problem loans to asset management companies. 
Putting it all together: monetary policy and its linkages 
Monetary policy could affect the housing market and, in turn, the overall economy by raising 
or lowering short-term interest rates. As discussed earlier, monetary policy seems quite 
potent in determining household consumption in Thailand. The growth of consumption and 
GDP appear to accelerate during periods of expansionary monetary policy and to slow when 
monetary policy is tighter. This pattern may be attributed to house price movements. 
Increases in house prices as a result of easy monetary policy may encourage households to 
increase their current consumption in the expectation of higher future income.  
This section analyses the above hypothesis by examining the transmission mechanism of 
house prices in the business cycle. Here we adopt the vector autoregression (VAR) 
methodology and estimate certain variables – GDP, private consumption, housing prices, 
household credit, the lending rate and the policy rate. These variables are deemed relevant 
from the stylised facts discussed in the earlier sections. As is commonly done in other 
studies, we use the short-term policy rate
7 as the measure of the monetary policy stance. 
The estimation is done using quarterly, seasonally adjusted data from the first quarter of 
1993 to the fourth quarter of 2007 with two lags. All variables except the policy rate are in log 
form. The VAR is identified using a “recursive” Choleski decomposition with the ordering of 
variables as described above. The VAR model already represents the reduced form system 
and the results are quite robust to alternative ordering.  
There are a number of channels through which higher interest rates affect household 
spending, house prices being one of the most important. Other things being equal, higher 
interest rates would reduce the demand for housing and hence house prices. Changes in 
house prices in turn have a wealth effect on consumption and GDP. Increased wealth can 
also be used as collateral to allow intertemporal substitution.  
Graphs 16 and 17 show the house price transmission mechanism of monetary policy shocks. 
Tighter monetary policy has a negative effect on house prices as well as on consumption and 
                                                  
7   We use the 14-day RP rate as the policy rate variable. On 17 January 2007, the Bank of Thailand switched to 
using the one-day RP rate. However, the 14-day and one-day rates are fairly close.  154  BIS Papers No 46
 
 
real GDP. House price shocks, in turn, have a significant effect on consumption and GDP. 
The causality test in Table 5 confirms the significance of both the policy rate and house price 
movements in determining spending in Thailand.  
Graph 16 
Response to policy rate shocks 
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Granger causality tests 
Dependent 










GDP    ***     *** 
Private 
consumption   ***  *    *** 
Housing prices        ***    ** 
Household credit      ***      *** 
Lending rate      ***      *** 
Policy  rate     *     
* Significant at 10% level.    ** Significant at 5% level.    * Significant at 1% level. 
 
To have an idea of the share of the fluctuations in aggregate GDP and housing prices that is 
caused by different shocks, Graphs 18 and 19 present variance decompositions for GDP and 
housing prices at forecast horizons up to 14 quarters. The graphs give the percentage of the 
variance due to each shock. The results indicate that after six quarters, short-term interest 
rate shocks account for about 20% of the fluctuation in house prices. At the same time, 
house prices and interest rate shocks account for about 20% and 40%, respectively, of the 
fluctuations in output.  
The magnitude of the output response to monetary policy and house price shocks in our 
analysis is due partly to the characteristics of the mortgage market in Thailand. Given the 
predominance of variable rate mortgage loans, house prices are particularly sensitive to 
movements in short-term rates. A reduction in the short-term rate can significantly depress 
mortgage rates and increase housing demand, resulting in higher house prices.  
Collateral has also been identified as an important factor in household credit access in 
Thailand. Household consumption capacity could therefore increase as a result of the wealth 
effect of higher home prices, which could relax household borrowing constraints. The loan-to-
value ratio has increased from 80% before the 1997 crisis to around 85–90% since the crisis. 
With greater wealth and declining down payment requirements and refinancing costs for 
housing loans, the effect of monetary policy on aggregate spending is enhanced. The 
potency of the housing price channel of monetary policy is also the result of several 
government-supported measures in terms of providing both housing loans and tax incentives 
for the real estate sector.  
Because the BOT is responsible for managing the level of aggregate demand in the 
economy to achieve optimal outcomes for both inflation and employment, it is sensible for the 
BOT to respond to home prices to the extent that these prices affect aggregate spending. 
The issue of how the BOT might respond to house price movements is not whether or not it 
responds but whether its response is over and above what is called for in terms of achieving 
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Our analysis suggests that when the BOT raises interest rates, households in Thailand might 
be harmed by falling house prices, resulting in a slowdown in spending. This seems to be 
consistent with the financial accelerator framework, where declining house prices could 
weaken many borrowers, thereby raising the cost of external funding and, hence, the 
effective interest rate. The BOT, however, also has the ability to offset the adverse 
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generally for all borrowers. In other words, the BOT has the tool it needs to keep the 
economy well balanced when households experience credit constraints. 
The effect of monetary policy and housing prices on spending in the Thai economy concerns 
not so much new borrowing, but rather the impact of higher interest rates on existing 
borrowing, and on the future willingness of lenders to provide credit. In a rising interest rate 
environment, lenders may tighten credit standards for high-risk borrowers because of 
concern about these borrowers’ ability to service their debt. The provision of credit is highly 
relevant to the consumption of groups, such as low-income households, that are generally 
credit-constrained. As discussed above, low-income households in Thailand have a relatively 
high debt burden. This possibly raises the sensitivity of the economy to interest rate changes. 
Low-income groups are more likely to be vulnerable to changes in interest rates because 
they are less likely to have other resources they can draw on to smooth consumption.  
Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper discusses the household sector, housing market and monetary policy framework 
in Thailand as well as their relationships with each other. It finds that the household debt and 
housing market situation in Thailand is generally healthy. Household debt is low and 
mortgage arrears have decreased significantly over the past few years. The ratio of 
household debt to income and housing price inflation in Thailand remain low, compared with 
other countries. Consumption growth is subdued as a result of slow house price growth and 
weak household spending in general. Meanwhile the proportion of non-performing household 
loans has declined substantially, from almost 18% of total household loans in early 2004 to 
only 4% at the end of 2007.  
Notwithstanding the declining ratio of non-performing household loans and the benign 
environment of Thailand’s housing market, most households are still vulnerable to economic 
shocks. The special-mention loan ratio for low-income households is high compared to that 
for higher-income households. In terms of financial access, one third of Thai households do 
not have access to credit and low-income households are found to be the most credit-
constrained.  
In terms of household balance sheets, assets far exceed debt. However, it should be noted 
that a large proportion of household assets in Thailand are illiquid assets, such as real 
estate, while household borrowing is dominated by housing loans. Aggregate spending is 
therefore particularly sensitive to house price movements.  
The housing-dominated structure of the household sector’s balance sheet, together with a 
reliance on variable rate mortgages, implies that the Thai economy is particularly sensitive to 
interest rate and house price movements. And because of this there is a general concern 
that the achievement of price stability may not be consistent with the achievement of financial 
stability.  
In a perfect world where policy measures are available to clamp down on booms at an early 
stage, they should be used in order to ensure future macroeconomic stability. But in the 
absence of such policies, the policy interest rate is another instrument that can be used to 
restrain house price growth, over and above its role vis-à-vis the inflation target. This 
suggests that interest rates could be set at a higher level during a housing boom, or at a 
lower level during a downturn, than is required to achieve the inflation target.  
However, the BOT view is that this may not be a good idea because raising interest rates 
simply to contain asset price booms, or decreasing interest rates to accommodate a decline 
in asset prices, may reduce one of the shocks, but probably at the risk of systematically 
missing the inflation target. This could destabilise the economy even more. In this context, 160  BIS Papers No 46
 
 
there is greater uncertainty on how fast and for how long the BOT should tighten monetary 
policy.  
Findings in this paper suggest that monetary policy is quite potent due to the increased 
sensitivity of the household sector to interest rate changes. The effect of monetary policy is 
transmitted via two channels. The first is the interest rate channel. When monetary policy is 
tightened, the cost of borrowing increases, leading to a slowdown in household borrowing 
and economic growth. The second is the housing price channel. Structural changes in the 
provision of housing loans and variable rate mortgages make this channel particularly 
effective. Since consumers are more likely to respond to a rate hike by cutting spending, 
central banks should proceed carefully when tightening monetary policy in order to assess its 
impact.  
In general, the BOT monetary policy stance is to change the policy rate in order to keep 
inflation within the specified range of the core inflation target. Maintaining interest rates 
higher or lower than is required to hit the inflation target in an attempt to rein in or boost 
housing prices is not consistent with the current view. The BOT, however, does monitor 
many financial imbalance indicators when making decisions about interest rates. 
Going forward, it may be useful to ask why consumer demand and household spending in 
Thailand have weakened and contribute less significantly to economic growth. One possible 
explanation for weak consumer spending is that households could have been revising their 
assessment of their permanent income downwards as a result of falling home prices. The 
situation is aggravated by the lack of access to credit in Thailand, especially for low-income 
households that need to borrow to finance consumption. With falling home prices, the value 
of the collateral against which owners can borrow is also reduced. In the future, more 
investigation is needed to achieve an understanding of how household debt and housing 
price misalignments interact in practice and affect the overall economy to enable us to design 
the appropriate monetary policy response to a shock. 
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